

3/1/04 Interview With General Eberhart

- Col. — ~~FOOTE~~ DAVID HAYDEN, U.S. ARMY
- JF
  - K.S.
  - M.K.
  - G. Brown
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- on 9-11- 33 yrs. exp.  
5 yrs. as a 4 Star Gen.  
— former fighter pilot  
— sat air S in Germany
- 1970's — he sat alert S in Germany  
— 1976-78 (formal alert w/loaded)  
AIC — Against Warsaw  
Warsaw pact).
- He never sat alert for NORAD Command.
- 1990 — he did ~~do~~ air alert inspection of air alert bases.
- Air Combat Command is the force provider

- Evolution of NORAD'S mission.
- There was a debate over the relevance of NORAD'S mission when the USSR dissolved.
- ↓
- Post Cold War Threat was seen as ICBM Threat from Russia.
- He did not see a "peer Competitor" coming into the U.S. from abroad.
- He was a proponent of down-sizing NORAD'S resources.
- 1997-99 - He was the Vice-Chief <sup>Chair</sup> of the Air Force.
- ↓
- He was probably involved in 1997 QDR discussion to reduce NORAD mission to 4 Air Alert Bases.
- He believed there should have been alert sites in mid 1990'S → The issue for him was ① who pulls the alert missions and at what costs? the ANG unit? or active Air units?

1990's

- Asymmetric threats for the military was still a reference to "the away game".
- They believed the domestic asymmetrical threats to U.S. would be a law enforcement issue (e.g. the Timothy McVeigh event).
- He says that he and Gen. Arnold ~~had~~ discussed the Cruise missile threat as the one NORAD was best prepared for. (could come from terrorists or enemy nation).
- NORAD felt there was a vulnerability to defend against cruise missile threat.
- Gen. Eberhart came to NORAD HQ in 2/00.
- He had some concerns that Gen. Myers had re: taken air sovereignty of NORAD.



- 6-8 months after Eberhart arrived at NORAD HQ (8/00 - 10/00) - He formed  
     ↓  
 - North American Surveillance Council → to stop the atrophy of the FAA / military radar picture.
- Pre 9-11 - Everybody agreed there should be greater radar coverage but nobody wanted to pay for it.
- FAA was saying it did not need primary radar coverage.
- Air Force - into Aerospace Control
- FAA - into Air Traffic Control.
- and - 1960-64 Air Force transferred Control of national Air Space to the FAA.
- "Very difficult to get FAA excited about" going joint training with DoD / NORAD.
- DoD was a bit of "a burn in the [FAA] saddle" when they wanted to do training exercises in natl. airspace.

- Pre 9-11 - NORAD did not think a lot ~~of~~ about DoD Aerial Assets use to help domestic law enforcement.
- \* - He is unaware of any NORAD Cmdr. having briefed to him ~~the~~ a threat similar to the events of 9-11.
- \* - He thought NORAD's assistance in drug war was slight.
- \* Primary threat to U.S. → Russians attacking w/ ICBM from abroad.
- They did postulate an air attack from abroad by terrorists pre 9-11 but:
  - ① The A/C would be ~~aggravating~~ squawking;
  - ② The pilots (and not terrorists) would be in control of plane
  - ③ NORAD would have a lot of time to react.
- He thinks FAA (pre 9-11) believed airport security was improved and any hijacking would be the traditional type.

- \* — He still does not know exactly what the ~~C~~ intel. Community had pre 9-11!
- Origin of threat TO D.C. → would likely come, if at all, from Russia (only people with long range capability / missiles).
- NORAD — not then assigned mission to protect U.S. Olympic sites, inauguration events, etc, pre 9-11.
- When we pulled back the Iron Curtain, we saw 1914 all over again and the situation that led to WW I.
- When he took over NORAD, (after collapse of USSR), he saw U.S.'s role as primarily in away game role in the middle East and Eastern Europe to keep balance / peace.



- <sup>saw</sup> NORAD priorities (just prior to 9-11):
    - ① missile Δ (B.M.)
    - ② way ahead for C.M. defense
    - ③ don't let radar coverage further atrophy.
- 

on 9-11

- CMOC - greater # of personnel present for exercises and responding to Russian Exercise.
- Command Director from CMOC called Eberhart and said FAA reported hijack and we authorized scramble of A/C. (Eberhart gets this call and then drives to his office).
- He sees report of A/C crash on T.V.
- He asks CMOC if the crash = 1<sup>st</sup> reported Hijack.
- CMOC says CNN is reporting a small A/C hit WTC.

- He <sup>thinks he</sup> sees 2<sup>nd</sup> WTC crash <sup>on T.V.</sup> and he concludes these ~~are~~ ~~are~~ intentional terrorist acts.
- He tried to call CTCIS → he is airborne somewhere.
- He stayed in his office b/c CMOC was well manned and there are dead spots (5-10 min. spots) on his phone coverage en route to CMOC.
- He Arrived in his office at About 9:00<sup>to</sup> A.M. E.S.T.  
9:10
- He was not bothered by the fact that NEADS/CONR scrambled A/C without going thru NORAD HQ/VNCC
- He expects NEADS/CONR to take actions based on their training / experience and situational awareness.  
↓  
He will enter the fight if NEADS/CONR is about to make a stupid decision.



- He thinks he left for Cnoc at around 9:30 A.M. from his office.
- ~~Langley~~ Langley scramble decision - would get to Eberhart after the fact.
- He does not recall hearing about the Langley scramble before he left his office for Cnoc.
- He did not hear about the rebirth of AAL II until recently.
- When he arrived at Cnoc issues were:
  - ① hijacked A/C headed West (he may have heard about this over the phone en route to Cnoc).
  - (he thought about the SEARS Tower as a possible target).
- ~~John Arnold~~ ~~Greg McKinley~~ → I may have told him FAA thinks there is a plane in the vicinity of D.C.
- Clp your travel too fast → the missiles won't work / fire when you arrive at your destination. (Threat)

- He was not involved in AFIO decision.
- Delta 1989 - Flt. → FAA notice comes at 9:41
- He says NORAD may have confused DAL 1989 with UAL 93.
- NORAD Command Director = the <sup>Jellinek (CF)</sup> spokesman on the Air Threat Conference Call.
  - ↓
  - Col Moulton says it may have been the AO (Air Officer) for the mission director that was on the ATC.
- Gen. Eberhart says he alone would make assessment of "Concern".
  - ↓
  - This was tied basically to a foreign attack.
- If he assesses Concern → it triggers a DEFCON surge and a # of consequences that would impact Russia, etc.
- If he says yes → it triggers

Some Unintended Consequences (e.g.

E.O. 13526, section 1.4(a)

— Around 9:40- 9:45 AM. — He got a lot of pressure from CROC to say "yes" — Cinc NORAD assesses Concern.

— He did not order all Alert sites to battle stations but was informed of decision.

— 10:02 AM. (on ATC) — Cinc NORAD declared Concern. (not yes).

\* — He was not aware that Andrews fighters were scrambled until recently.

— He had no role in discussions re: V.P. order to shoot-down A/C.

— He thinks he heard about this right after he got to CROC.



- His notion was → let's make sure we see a hostile act and not just a plane off course.
- He thinks Mr. Fendley told him the V.P. ordered it.
- It had already been communicated down the chain when he heard about it.
- He told his people to tell COMC to make sure they saw a hostile act before exercising this authority.
- Issue: Could a fighter pilot engage a hostile A/C based on V.P. order w/out going up the chain of command? - He says it is a timing issue.
- "Rules of Engagement are no good unless those that are engaged know the rules."
- Gen Wherley did not have the authority to issue a Weapons free Zone Order.

- Even if there is a Weapons free zone → he believes that, if time permits, the fighter pilot is obliged to go up the Chain of Command for approval.
- Impt. to distinguish b/w Air Traffic Control (FAA) and Command and Control.
  - ↳ the fighter pilots were controlled by NORAD through NEADS.
- He believed NEADS was in contact w/ fighters over NYC and D.C.
  - ↳ If not, they would talk to pilots thru FAA in event of emergency.
- DeFCOn 3 Declaration -
  - "We debated advantages / disadvantages of this decision".
  - ↳ He remembers talking about it but ~~the~~ he thinks the Pentagon made the decision.
- He believes DeFCOn 3 was intended for different circumstances than the 9-11

- In Gen. Eberhart's view the ROE Change to Transition (per Defcon 3 order) would not have changed what they had already told the fighter pilots pursuant to the V.P. shoot-down Order.
- Declaration of limited SCATANA:
  - He was involved in this decision.
  - In his view, the military was not postured to take control of NAS. (there were still A/C in air; emergency A/C and law enforcement A/C would be launched throughout the day).
- ↳ He told his people to go draft a modified version of SCATANA (bore war ads on, etc.).

SCATANA = COLD WAR relic

TOS

At Tactical, Operational and Strategic levels (post 9-11) discussions arose regarding what went wrong on 9-11.



- Main concern: Time/distance factor and lack of sufficient notice complicated the day for NORAD.

- Adtl. concerns: more alert sites needed to provide greater domestic coverage. - led to recommendations for tier alert levels. (What will be long term structure of NORAD.)

\* - Relationship w/ FAA post 9-11 was major concern. (NORAD needed to be linked to all FAA radars).

- ~~So~~ NORAD is the last resort.

- We must prevent hijackers from entering U.S. and entering our planes.

### Timelines

- Early timelines helped NORAD determine that problems were  
A.) FAA notification and  
B.) R.O.E.

- Mr. Elshart → ~~found~~ firmly states the focus was on BAL 1/89.

FAA 11  
AA 77  
JAL 175  
JAL 93

- Gen. Eberhart has not seen the revised NORAD timeline given to us last week.
- Post 9-11 Concerns: What if the U.S. pilot is in complicity with the ~~terrorists~~ terrorists?
- He will never be ~~comf~~ comfortable w/ Egypt air accident. (and I think he means its true cause).
- He thinks ANC performs NORAD mission the best.
- Most valuable Intel coming to NORAD post 9-11 -
  - 1.) Interrogation of ~~terrorists~~ terrorists at Guantanamo Bay.
  - 2.) Law Enforcement Intel.
- Posse Comitatus - NORAD knows of no changes that need to be made now. This could change in the future.
- ~~What~~<sup>How</sup> will 9-11 events be seen in U.S. history in 100 yrs?

- ① He hopes they never forget it.
- ② He hopes we win the war on terror.

- How will we know we won the war?

- This is hard to answer. - For every one suspect we capture, there will be 5 more.

- We have to attack gross roots problems → poverty, disproportionate b/w cultures in wealth, rights, etc.

- Gen. Eberhart did not <sup>specifically</sup> order the drafting of a new timeline.

- He did not know we were given a new timeline last week.

→ Gen. Eberhart has a general standing order to correct timeline if new information warrants it regardless of how it changes reflect on NORAD.



- Right after 9-11, he was more focused on fighting the war and not re-constructing the timeline.
- He was focused on preventing a post 9-11 attack.

ED  
Gen Eberhart

Mar 01, 2004

19

ACC  
assets

former ACC Command. IG  
↳ Force Provider  
Org Train & Equip

Debate over time was uneven  
argued both sides of issue  
didn't see a peer competitor  
but air sovereignty was important  
Presence was important

97-99 Vice Chief of Staff of the AF  
needed a capability  
none was Active or NG  
not whether or not we needed alert  
sites

asymmetries — away game  
didn't apply to home game  
classical attrition warfare less likely

General Arnold Robert Morrison  
not aware of the study  
which may have been C.M.  
best prepared for

Feb 2000

20

A.S. Same concerns as Gen Meyer had  
FAA "squawking & talking"  
ATC would be airspace control

NA air surveillance. Council:

6-8 mo after he came on board  
went on record thru the NASC  
to get a fair share arrangement  
can't keep waiting for new legislation  
if not 7/1, would have continued down

Study goes back to 1960  $\pm$  4 years  
AF owned all the airspace  
then began referring to FAA - FAA stood  
air traffic ~~up~~  
soviets missiles not LRA  
we were in charge then but not 40  
years later - we grew too far  
from them

Joint training was difficult - difficult  
to get FAA excited - we didn't push  
very hard - usually that felt well

from 9-11 FAA note in N.E.  
allen was to take off & get to  
a target



21  
They were exclusively LE  
We support Local Federal Agency - always had  
+ Local can ask the Guard that

no NORAD car had a documented threat  
briefed to him

- #1 threat Russians go crazy
- #2 looking out re drug enforcement
  - follow
  - report

we did not have credible actionable info  
did <sup>have</sup> some scenarios re hijackings

- scenarios
- would have time
- pilot in control
- still talking to ATIS
- knew where it was

FAN - not one to back

- security, good
- classical hijack

NORAD should have known - reported to  
them if there was a 9/11-like threat

(Passengers)  
We didn't want for them over DC  
We want to get the merchandise the machine  
Norse set up a CTS program

Special Events not on scope  
wasn't on assigned mission  
intercepting high flier at 8 Mach

AT fall of FSU he was a bel man  
Pulled back curtain that was 1914 all  
over again

2000  
Priorities

It would always be an away game  
- here to bed down <sup>overse</sup> missile defense  
- who is charge NATO? w/ Canadians  
- don't let nuclear atrophy  
against sentiment that NATO  
should go away

Russian threat questioned

but they continued to probe  
when ever they were us more

more people on duty at a higher rank  
our presence was greater  
didn't change the outcome but  
our response was more efficient

CD called him at before 7 (local)

thru classical

drives to AF Space Command

had CNN on

calls CMC - left committee  
a/c

No one could tell him it was  
the hijack 2/c

Waiting & saw 2d but - doesn't  
know about 2d hijack - America  
something is wrong

Tried to call CTKS

called VTKS on the hill

go to Cheyenne or me

dead spots in his car comm

A scramble doesn't cost us anything  
he backed the decision

no rectoring - all you can do is  
mess that up

Different if there are international ramifications  
↑ to Myers something terrible is going up  
0930, EST to CMOC

on his net everything was quiet  
he walked into the 57 issue  
The crew wouldn't know call  
signs - they ran to targets

Did not recall training that long,  
was something

at CMOC. Did used to

would handling hijack. many have  
within the on floor  
two sets on training I think I self



24  
Would they be able to do this (Robert)  
FAH calls, when in the airplane

Annex  
(~~Greg McKinley~~) called  
FAA thinks there might be  
plane in vicinity of White House  
call not logged

if you go to fast - miracles will come off  
or won't work  
Not involved in AFIO decision

There is a time distance factor we  
can't beam up

NORAD spokesman on ATCC CD

Assessment  
for a foreign attack  
if yes DC out of sight  
we lead bunker  
in yes because of consequences

Stephen Hayes  
in presence for discussion

didn't order all AA to be withdrawn

Concern - because everyone was  
up & wouldn't do anything outrageous

can't say with language in the  
assassination scene

made sure response is tailored to what  
we see

VP may have come across before  
he got to mtg. His perspective  
we want to see a hostile act  
we need to protect America, but don't  
not make a mistake

There were people who wanted to  
oppose the RAL

Believes that Gen Finley said VP  
was authorized

His thought - that's good - but  
might be extreme - want to see a  
hostile act - had already been  
communicated down the line

But more sure each was looking  
for hostile act

know who wants to do this job. (I mean the person who was there. E.g. the fighter pilots)

It is a Q of timing. There are German people. ROE. If he was German, suspicious he would have been talking to someone.

Assumed it would have been passed to the cockpit.

Formalized the ROE the next day or so.

"Weapons Free" Whelan, didn't have the authority to give that.

If Even if order is WF we still going thru what he mentioned earlier. It is not am.fue body.

In combat - make sure you don't have a frikide - must have procedure ID



Q. Can ATC pass authority  
Distinguish ATC & CFC,  
He has CFC thru NEADS  
ATC was Wash Center

~~was told~~

Otis would have been easier

DESCON 3 declared  
We debated  
I came from Pentagon  
Remember talking about it  
It was designed for other things

Didn't change what we had already  
told the pilots

SCATANA,

Two concerns

- speed & intent more basic
- procedure - we weren't prepared
- things in SCATANA that were counterproductive

He wanted to make out of the equation

SCATANA was a relic  
wasn't working to identify an area

Aftermath

The replay

Happen at tactical & operational  
level — however you have  
what you need

What complicates the time

- Time Distance warning
- expanded radar
- Liaison
- what you want on alert for handling
- come up w/ levels
- used 50 minutes as the benchmark  
for warning
- ended up w/ tiered alert levels
- most important — FAA data relationship
- New display / look FAA → WEARS → Cockpit

Long term stance — an defense level

So DoA knows what he is buying  
Checkloaders for TSA, intel sharing

Timeline will change

Not exact

Problem solving

In progress

PK-5

and now to work for 5th to 6th to 7th to 8th to 9th to 10th

- Timeliness served a purpose
- whole world is clamoring for timeliness
- Not designed as a falsification

It is what it is

He is going

time goes by - going

Uncovering the only to go on there  
after an unknown threat

Prospectively

→ Intuitive what is the threat that we  
are not preparing against

NORAD alerting system they will look

have AD is guard - no one can do it  
better

fund is gone for the budget years

There is no other way to do it

Quantity of info shown is very good



- State our  
Interpretations  
LS info

→ Please Commitment

Always - lead it if it's necessary.  
We will continue to lead it

9/11 100% w/ m more

Hope they don't forget,  
Don't know when we'll see  
Attacks not caused

Gen & didn't know we had a new timeline

Post 9/11 didn't focus on  
reconstruction

never been asked to spin

Post 9/11 Scramble Plan  
so pilots know where  
they will be going